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THE USES OF (AN)OTHER HISTORY




The question that animates this paper
is deceptively simple: what is brought into
‘play’ in the conjunction of the signifiers
‘Britishness’ and ‘Otherness’? Is the coup-
ling of these two terms merely a taxonomic
convenience, a way of marking out appar-
ently fixed, mostly immutable categories
such as ‘nation’, ‘cultural practice’, ‘ethni-
city’ and ‘Empire’? Or, conversely, is the
opposition of ‘Britain-as-subject’ and its
panoply of archipelagic and colonial ‘ob-
jects’ essentially a tactical manoeuvre
driven by ongoing investments in a partic-
ular kind of narrative economy? Does the
narration of nationhood, in spite of the
multiplicity of standpoints or cunning
segues in time and location the historian
evokes, always and inevitably depend on
the persistence of specific rhetorical
structures? To wit, a teleological orienta-
tion, the working out of time via the trope
of linearity and, most significantly, an
abiding motif of the nation as a ‘sovereign
ontological subject’.1  As Edward Said
notes in the introduction to Culture and
Imperialism, ‘the power to narrate, or to
block other narratives from forming and
emerging, is very important to culture and
imperialism and one of the main connec-
tions between them.’2
If we were to trace this distinction
between Britishness and Otherness inward
from where we imagine the boundary of
its ‘outside’ to be, an alternate series of
questions would be provoked. How does
the figure of the Other function to author-
ise specific conceptions of Britishness?
Through what discursive techniques is the
Other inaugurated and sustained? Is the
Other only ever rendered strategically, as
a cipher in a great cryptogram of imperial
nationhood, or does it endure as a definit-
ive (and therefore representative) presence?
How can political and epistemic power be
seen to operate in the critical separation
of Britishness from its absolute exterior,
the tyranny of its vast ‘not-self’?
The conundrum of Britishness and
Otherness is always and already a problem
of the line and the boundary. That which
presents itself as denotatively simple and
grammatically efficient — the apparently
modest copula ‘and’ — drives the terms
Britishness/Otherness both together as an
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‘irreducible conceptual pai[r]’3  and apart
in their ‘seemingly clear-cut oppositio[n]’.
Drawing the two signifiers toward one
another, the ‘and’ occupies a (non) space
that is both constitutive of the opposition,
but also absolutely outside of it. Consider-
ing the function of the frame (or bound-
ary) in painting, Jacques Derrida observes
that it is neither in, nor of, the work itself.
Where the frame, or parergon, delineates
the boundary of the work (ergon), it is
already a ‘hybrid of outside and inside’4
that ‘disconcerts any opposition but does
not remain indeterminate’.5 This dynamic
repeats itself ceaselessly in discourses of
power and privilege, its light throbbing
pulse a reminder that the two halves of
any opposition cannot be knifed apart ar-
bitrarily, as much as it may appear far
easier, in a conceptual sense, to do so. The
border (or ‘frame’, or the ‘and’ or the
‘outside’) cannot be peeled away and dis-
carded. Derrida’s theory of framing serves
as a reminder that meaning is already
deeply implicated in inside/outside rela-
tions, and, as such, defies a finite point or
limit.
Where does Britishness start (if it is
not already impossible to proffer the
question)? Is it an identity, a mode of be-
ing in the world, confined solely to ‘a
group of cultures situated along an Anglo-
Celtic frontier and marked by an increas-
ing English political and cultural domina-
tion’?6  Can such an ‘archetypal’ concep-
tion of Britishness, based on geo-political
boundaries and cultural hegemony, be
read productively against a narrative of
Britishness as an unstable amalgam of
(post)colonial difference? When the intern-
al boundaries of Britishness (between the
four significant white-skinned ethnic
groups — the English, Scots, Welsh and
Irish — and ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ racial
groups in the contemporary multi-culture)
are juxtaposed with those ‘quasi’-British
identities that proliferated on the ‘external
frontiers’7  of the Empire (‘non-white’
colonised citizens and ‘white’ settler
classes), a plethora of edges, axes and
borderlines is generated. As these lines
intersect, fuse and fracture, each boundary
becomes progressively ‘fuzz[ier]’.8
My explorations in this paper respond
to the difficulties inherent in working
productively with binary forms of iden-
tity. Who is ‘British’? Who is ‘Other’? Is
it possible to delimit both the inside and
outside of this opposition accurately? In
putting Britishness and Otherness back ‘in
play’, I also mean to consider whether the
invocation of the Other in this context is
merely an opportune appropriation of
post-structuralist idiom, or, potentially, a
way into a methodology useful for think-
ing through what was at stake in the pro-
hibition of particular identities within the
Empire. As a way into the Britishness/Oth-
erness dyad, I will consider the account
of the emergence of British identity offered
by Linda Colley in her essay Britishness
and Otherness: An Argument. 9  My aim is
to engage Colley’s historical speculations
in conversation with critical strategies and
theoretical frameworks advanced in discip-
lines such as Cultural Studies and White-
ness Studies. I contend that such a dia-
logue will disrupt the opposition of the
‘concrete’ with the ‘abstract’ implicit in
the dichotomy of Britishness and Other-
ness and allow for the exploration of
minority white identities that are often
under-explored in existing histories of the
period.
I come to the disciplinary concerns of
‘History’ as cultural theorist in pursuit of
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the perversely obvious — that is, white
people. The relation of ‘History’ to ‘The-
ory’ (also capitalised and rigorously discip-
linary) could be described politely as
fractious. History, as broadly artifactual
and focused on the production of truthful-
ness, is apparently antithetical to the en-
tirely more sceptical, more contestatory
style of theoretical conjecture. Where
theory looks for ‘histories’, entertaining
partiality and a certain ‘epistemic insecur-
ity’,10  history perceives relativism, and
an ‘atmosphere of permissiveness toward
questioning the meaning of historical
events’.11 While I am guilty here of exag-
gerating the dialectical relation of history
and theory, there are certain central diffi-
culties that must be admitted when at-
tempting to put history and theory in
conversation. ‘The writing of history’, as-
serts Prasenjit Duara ‘is antitheoretical,
first, because it is the principal means of
naturalising the nation-state as the contain-
er of, or the skin that contains, the exper-
iences of the past.’12  How would the
writing of history, the knitting and
stretching of the nation’s ‘skin’ with all
the stark, primordial connotations that this
image evokes, operate differently, ex-
traordinarily?
Curiously, there seems to be an emer-
ging consensus that theoretical imperatives
do not change the work of history — the
immersion in archives, the close reading
of primary source material, the ethical
imperative to account for the past and the
dead — but alter the relationship of the
historian with the act of narrating. ‘To
conceive of difference in the past’, write
Ann Curthoys and John Docker, quoting
Foucault, ‘is to conceive of the Other in
the time of our own thought. And that
means we must recognise that the historian
too is not unified within himself, he is not
a sovereign subject whose consciousness
is fully knowable to himself.’13 The sub-
ject who doesn’t experience her capacity
to know as concretising, as a measure of
full and complete presence, may perhaps
persist more readily with the differences
and contradictions that haunt all ideologic-
ally encoded attempts to explain human
experience. To turn to Duara again briefly:
‘Theory is useful to me not because it illu-
minates a hidden truth freed by the death
of the past. Theory illuminates the object
because it provokes the historian as sub-
ject.’14
The search for specific ethnic identities
at work in Imperial Britain, albeit as part
of a broader enquiry into whiteness and
racial superiority more generally, has
prompted me to ponder who, or what, was
authorised at the time under the sign of
Britishness. At the zenith of the Empire,
in the heart of its metropole, could a sub-
ject possess white skin, but still not be
British? The study of white racial and
ethnic identities has gained steady cur-
rency in the academy over the last 20
years, but it has only been in the past
decade that such work has precipitated
the naming of a specific field of enquiry
with a discernable critical mandate. These
investigations are now generally referred
to, with or without an ironic inflection, as
whiteness studies. Whiteness Studies re-
sponds to the surge in anti-racist scholar-
ship that followed social and political
fluctuations across the globe post-World
War II. Most directly and significantly, it
references the civil rights movement in
America in the 1960s. As such, this work
addresses three core considerations.
Firstly, it contends that a significant
number of white-skinned people do not
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accept that they are raced. Furthermore,
whiteness is seen to persist as a position
of socio-cultural and political invisibility
or neutrality, despite the fact that it en-
ables some subjects to achieve highly vis-
ible and discernable levels of privilege.
Finally, whiteness studies recognises that
subjects who are interpellated as white
exercise significantly greater discursive
and material power than those who are
not.
Whiteness is frequently equated with
a sense of everydayness. The white sub-
ject, in terms of both corporeality and
cultural efficacy, becomes hypernormal-
ised and is rendered invisible against an
expansive landscape of visible fetishes15
— subjects who do not sign, and are not
signed back, as white. Thus it has been
the project of whiteness studies to address
the problem of whiteness as invisibility,
its condition, described by Toni Morrison
as ‘mute, meaningless, unfathomable,
pointless, frozen, veiled, curtained,
dreaded, senseless and implacable’,16  by
making visible its effects; to counterbal-
ance the omnipresent ‘nowheres’ that
whiteness seems to emanate from by recov-
ering the ‘somewheres’ in which it can be
seen to be operating.
There has been a torrent of work that
considers the formation of white identities
in the United States. Studies such as David
Roediger’s The Wages of Whiteness, 17
which assesses how the American working
classes progressively ‘whitened’ in re-
sponse to the entry of African-Americans
and successive waves of immigrants into
the free labour market, and Noel Ignatiev’s
work, How the Irish Became White, 18
which charts the progression of Irishness
from a marginal non-white identity to its
interpellation in the normative white
centre, have established the conditions for
a thoroughgoing analysis of occluded ra-
cial identities. However, the paradigm of
American racial analysis does not translate
easily or necessarily effectively between
continents or histories. Issues of race, as
framed in the American context of slavery
and the civil rights movement, stand more
clearly delineated — the problem of
whiteness is heightened, energised even,
through its proximity to the ‘absoluteness’
signified by black skin. Such circum-
stances are not mirrored as acutely in mid-
nineteenth century Britain. Absolute racial
difference is an experience confined
largely to the colonial periphery. Instead,
there are four main ethnic groupings —
the English, Scots, Welsh and Irish who
apparently do not differ phenotypically,
that is at the level of biological body, but
who experience the non-biological or in-
scriptive body differently. This intersec-
tion of the biological with the inscriptive
is interesting and relevant because it dis-
rupts and complicates three significant
analytical assumptions currently inherent
in whiteness studies. The first of these is
that the possession of white skin in and of
itself equates to privilege. The second is
that all subjects coded and interpellated
as white enjoy equal access to specific
practices of behaviour, gesture and signi-
fication that produce cultural and material
power. Finally, Whiteness Studies often
presumes that a practice of whiteness must
be ascribed limits by a co-existing practice
of ‘blackness’ or ‘non-whiteness’ (i.e. a
literal and symbolic difference based on
skin).
As someone who is interested in the
production of what is broadly, and some-
times glibly, termed ‘identity’, I am
acutely aware of the tension in play
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between my own post-structuralist inclin-
ations (the drive toward ways of reading
and questioning that are ‘polytopic and
supple’)19  and the simultaneous desire for
a ‘thick’ historical understanding groun-
ded in evidence. In seeking to think
through the implications of Britishness as
an identity, or set of complementary
identities, governed by specific set of
prohibitions and interdictions, I don’t as-
sume that identity is merely a synonym
for culture, or that all inquiries into iden-
tity are primarily cultural. Identity is, to
steal a phrase from Foucault, the ‘strategic
elaboration’ over time of the interplay
between the cultural, social and political.
Thus, the examination of identity should
be able to support the analysis of vectors
such as class, race or gender without re-
quiring that one necessarily be subordin-
ated to any other.
* * * * *
Linda Colley’s article, ‘Britishness and
Otherness: An Argument’ appeared in the
Journal of British Studies in 1992, shortly
after the publication of her monograph
Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837. 20
I am interested in Colley's work not only
because of the status that the book has
amongst work which assesses the emer-
gence of Britishness as a national identity,
but because her article 'Britishness and
Otherness' is one of the very few that dir-
ectly couples these terms together and
presents them as mutually constitutive.
Colley’s article opens on Viscount
McCartney of Dervock, emissary of George
III to the Chinese Emperor Ch’ien–lung,
shivering in the dark, blank hours of a
freezing autumn night. McCartney’s mis-
sion to China was predominantly an eco-
nomic one. As the first representative of
the British government in China, his mis-
sion was threefold. Firstly, he was to per-
suade the Emperor to accept a permanent
British embassy. Secondly, he was to nego-
tiate expanded strategic and trade oppor-
tunities for the East India Company by at-
taining permission to establish trading
posts at strategic points on the Chinese
coast. Lastly, it fell to him to convince the
Emperor that the quality and ingenuity of
British manufacturing was such that mass
importation should be permitted.21  How-
ever, despite a reciprocal giving of gifts
and a lavish state reception, Chi’en-lung
was impervious to the British proposals
and assurances of mutual benefit. Colley
records that McCartney, an Ulster Scot,
and his retinue (comprised variously of
two Scotsmen, a protestant Irishman, a
Welshman and a Kentish artist amongst
others whose ethnicities are not specified),
were, despite their differences in country
of origin and background, ‘united by an-
ger and by something more. In the pres-
ence of an alien and contemptuous culture,
they felt all of a sudden intensely British,
brought together, almost despite them-
selves by confrontation with the Other.’22
This diplomatically unproductive en-
counter between Orient and Occident
functions as a primal scene in the concret-
isation of Britishness. The implicit menace
of the foreigner operates to erase any pre-
vailing differences between the Britons
themselves — ethnicity, provincialism,
and even distinctions related to class are
annihilated in the refusal of the non-self
to return the gaze and appropriately inter-
pellate the white presence. Britishness,
according to Colley, is thus inaugurated
and sustained by the presence of threat.
As a supranational identity, Britishness is
applied, template-like, across regional
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differences and affiliations, effacing the
anomalous experiences of Highlander and
Lowlander, northerner and southerner,
the rural and the metropolitan. Although
Colley stresses the necessarily artificial and
contingent nature of British identity —
her term for it is ‘forged’23  with its curi-
ous double association of shaping/hammer-
ing and duplicitousness and trickery — it
enables suspiciously organic political
manoeuvrings against the potentially hos-
tile stranger. Such manoeuvrings are not,
she asserts, ‘imposed from the centre and
not an anglicisation of the Celtic fringe’,24
nor are they consequent on the integration
or homogenisation of the internal cultures
of the United Kingdom. Thus, what Col-
ley’s analysis requires is a metanarrative
point of identification which can accom-
modate the vicissitudes of the three na-
tions she considers generative to British-
ness, namely England, Scotland and
Wales. That point of reconciliation is
Protestantism.
In Colley’s schema, Protestantism su-
tures the potentially fractious English,
Scots and Welsh together as a representat-
ive British presence against the menace of
Continental Catholicism.25  She argues that
it was the continuing threat of French in-
vasion throughout the 100 Years War,
combined with the lesser, but still conceiv-
able, possibility of a Jacobite incursion
through Scotland that transcended nation-
al and ethnic boundaries within Britain.
The French Catholic threat required that
Britain adopt a war footing; Colley notes
that at the War of Spanish Succession,
which culminated in 1713, the British
army constituted some 130,000 men. By
1815, in the aftermath of Waterloo, the
national army plus the militia and East
India Company numbered one million
men, or one in five of the adult male pop-
ulation.26 This war machine was nour-
ished by state propaganda that both reiter-
ated the inside/outside opposition and
simultaneously supported the contradis-
tinction of Protestantism and Catholicism.
With an emphasis on both the circulation
of familiar stereotypes and the clear delin-
eation of good and evil, this inculcation
acted to quicken the national narrative.
The national narrative is seen to be
strengthened again, recast or forged anew,
in the pursuit of Empire. Colley is careful
to distinguish between the 13 American
colonies, which she designates as the
‘English’ empire, and the later ‘British
Empire’. The British Empire is character-
ised not only by its sheer territorial reach,
but also by the participation of Scots,
Scots-Irish and Anglo-Irish in its adminis-
trative ranks in rates disproportionate to
the percentage of population they repres-
ented within Britain itself. Inevitably, the
Empire is invoked as a differential space
against which Britishness could cohere.
‘Britains could join together vis-à-vis the
Empire’, writes Colley, ‘and act out the
flattering parts of heroic conqueror, hu-
mane judge and civilising agent.’27 What
the colonised, particularly the Irish, might
have felt of their part in the shoring up of
an enduring British national sentiment is
apparently in excess of the argument’s
scope and capacities.
Thus far Colley has presented British-
ness as one element in a dichotomous rela-
tion. As a category, it inheres only in the
presence of that which is outside, and in
surfeit, of it. The binary is a treacherous,
if compelling, form of thought. Not only
is it governed by the logic of the excluded
middle, whereby something is or isn’t, but
it can never simultaneously be and not-be.
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That is, you could be British, or you could
be Other, but never both British and Other.
The binary is ultimately hierarchical,
privileging one element over and above
its pair, most usually the term cited first.
This inversion reveals the Other as only
ever supplementary, as constantly and
inevitably exchangeable. As Michel De
Certeau observes of modern Western his-
toriography, ‘intelligibility is established
through a relation with the other; it moves
(or “progresses”) by changing what it
makes of its “other” — the Indian, the
past, the people, the mad, the child, the
Third World’.28  In the context of Colley’s
narration of Britishness, the chain of sub-
stitutions reveals itself: China is erased by
Catholics who are in turn supplanted by
the indigenous populations of the Empire.
The Other, therefore, cannot have the
quality of a thing-in-itself. It can only
suggest the proliferation of a boundary,
the uncertainty within a liminal space. The
Other is only ever figurative and thus
partial. Where the centre (the British) is
possessed of a metaphysics, the periphery
is construed as entirely metonymic and so
depredated of representative presence.
The effects of binary thinking cannot
be circumvented by inversion. Privileging
the secondary term does not, by default,
dissolve the first. Thinking through the
deployment of terms such as ‘Self and
Other’, or the corollary opposition of
‘centre and margin’, is neither a comfort-
ing or necessarily successful enterprise.
Methodologically, the ‘other’ is an un-
stable category. It cannot be seen merely
as the neutral indicator of a space ‘beyond’
— be that semantic, geographic, political
or otherwise. The term ‘Other’, when em-
ployed in twenty-first century critical en-
deavours, is always already embedded in
a network of trace and association from
which it cannot be recovered, pristine and
ready, for whatever work we desire it to
do. Thus, the Other is already and immut-
ably tied to the discourse of psychoanalys-
is, as that which Jacques Lacan postulates
as the unattainable object of desire. In this
arguably unhappy scenario, subjectivity
plays itself out in a frantic striving to at-
tain that from which the self is ultimately
alienated (the Other) without succumbing
to aphanisis, the loss of the signifier that
the self invokes to sustain the phantasy of
wholeness. Or, to cite Julia Kristeva, the
Other is the abject. The abject is that cat-
egory of phenomena that the self must
expel, be it either as ‘defilement, sewage
and muck’29  or the fear of the outsider in
the form of the stranger, in order to live.
Similarly, the generic Other already refer-
ences the ‘Other’ of linguistic poststructur-
alism — the elusive semiotic element that
is endlessly deferred ensuring that the sign
remains persistently incomplete. Poststruc-
turalism has also underwritten the discurs-
ive and political restitution of subaltern
subjectivities — those othered subjects in
excess of Enlightenment rationality, mas-
culinity, heterosexuality and whiteness.
Lastly, albeit inexhaustively, these projec-
tions intermingle with the Other of the
anthropological ‘interview’, the judicial
Other of Althusser’s interpellative en-
counter and, perhaps a little unfashionably
now, Satre’s existential Other. The Other,
as such, is a dirty word, perhaps beyond
a productive rehabilitation.
The dependence on the Other to con-
cretise Britishness also has the con-
sequence of demanding that the primary
term remain internally consistent. Colley
acknowledges the conceptual and political
implausibility of this arrangement in an
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unexpected and somewhat strident para-
graph toward the essay’s conclusion,
where she writes that:
I am not, for one moment,
suggesting that their shared imper-
ial obsession, and shared access to
imperial booty, invariably con-
cealed from Britons their own in-
ternal divisions – the cultural
splits among Englishness, Irish-
ness, Scottishness and Welshness,
the gaps in experience and sym-
pathy among different regions,
social classes and religious group-
ings and between the sexes. But
Empire did serve as a powerful
distraction and cause in com-
mon.30
While this complication is certainly
challenging, I am yet to realise a way in
which the model of Britishness that Colley
has outlined could accommodate such
variables whilst resisting collapse. Cer-
tainly Colley herself provides no example
as to how a model of Britishness so deeply
reliant on internal consistency could integ-
rate a minority or contestatory position.
Her treatment of Ireland demonstrates, to
a certain extent, the limitations of this
paradigm for working through gradations
or liminalities of Britishness. Ireland, des-
pite its long established economic and
governmental ties to England and its cul-
tural relation to Gaelic regions through
Scotland, is positioned as outside the ‘na-
tional’ narrative of Britishness by virtue
of what Colley posits as its ‘strictly limited
response to the Protestant reformation’,31
i.e. its continuing status as a Catholic na-
tion. If Britishness rests at some deep
structural level on the unifying capacity
of shared Protestant beliefs then, by this
definition, the Irish cannot be British des-
pite their location in Pocock’s ‘Atlantic
archipelago’ and their historical interaction
with the mainland nations. Eventually,
Colley does elaborate a little as to her
reasons for excluding Ireland from the
framework of British becoming that she
has carefully advanced. Her explanation
is tripartite: the Act of Union that married
Ireland to the United Kingdom survived
only 120 years; Ireland was sympathetic
to France and might have aided a French
invasion of the mainland; and, finally, that
Ireland’s status as a quasi-colony fatally
complicated its interpolation into a hege-
monic narrative of British nationhood.
Again, how the presence of Irish Catholic
soldiers or administrators in the Empire
can be encompassed or explained by this
model of national emergence is uncertain.
Although I find Colley’s speculations
problematic, there is much in her analysis
that is admirable: an unwillingness to al-
low Britishness to be synonymous with
Englishness; a sensitivity to local and re-
gional experience; and a distrust of easy
nationalisms. She is committed to demon-
strating that Britishness was both an ima-
ginative fiction and an energetic political
identity, aware to a certain degree of its
own artifice. Yet at the argument’s conclu-
sion we are reminded again of what has to
be effaced (or at the very least obscured,
if not suppressed) in order that her thesis
appear coherent and successful. Referring
to the emergence of a new British elite,
Colley acknowledges the ‘Rich, landed,
and talented males from Wales, Scotland,
England, and to a lesser extent Ireland
[who] became welded after the 1770s into
a single ruling class that intermarried,
shared the same outlook and took to the
business of governing, fighting for, and
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profiting from greater Britain’.32  Is there
room in this schema for Britains who were
neither wealthy, propertied nor educated?
In short, where is the working class?
Could the working class, along with the
Irish, represent the dilemma of the pheno-
typically similar non-white? The non-
British in white skin? A degree of support
for this view can be found in Alistair
Bonnett’s study of the Victorian working
class, ‘How The British Working Class
Became White: The Symbolic (Re)forma-
tion of Racialized Capitalism’. In a cogent
and provocative argument to which I
cannot entirely do justice to in this con-
text, Bonnett contends that ‘metaphorical
and literal depictions of racial whiteness
were employed as a new paradigm of class
hierarchy’33  and that such depictions
were formulated in colonial and settler
societies and exported back to the metro-
pole. Initially, this mythical sense of
whiteness was a bourgeois preserve, and
the denial of ‘authentic racial whiteness’34
to the lower classes could be seen to be
achieved through the employment of two
specific strategies of deferral: (i) through
the ‘imaginative alignment’ of the worker
with the non-white;35  and (ii) via the as-
sertion that biological differences pro-
duced a ‘literal racial distinction’ between
the lower, middle and upper classes.36
However, as the imperial project advanced
and the welfare state consolidated, white
identity became progressively more access-
ible to the working class. Bonnett observes
however, that this whiteness was not the
whiteness of Bourgeois English exception-
alism, but a ‘popularist identity connoting
superiority, but also ordinariness, nation
and community’.37
Throughout this paper, it has been my
intention to question the easy invocation
of the Other in the construction of racial
identities. In conclusion, I would posit that
simply calling attention to existence of the
binary itself or extrapolating its paramet-
ers is an inadequate response to the com-
plications of binary thought. Writing of
the tensions inherent in distinguishing a
British history from the hegemonic narrat-
ive of English nationhood, Pocock advoc-
ates that the dyad England/Britain can be
countenanced only through the cultivation
of what he describes as a ‘two-fold con-
sciousness’ that can accommodate the ‘re-
cogni[tion] that things happen in different
places at the same time’. Interestingly,
however, Pocock’s dilemma cannot be
satisfactorily resolved via the conjuring
of yet another dualism, ‘the two-fold con-
sciousness’. The way out of the Eng-
land/Britain impasse is through the sum-
moning of a third term, to ‘complicat[e]
the original load-bearing structure [of the
hierarchical binary] beyond recognition’.38
That term, almost inevitably, is Ireland.
The binary cannot be undone by inver-
sion, or even by butterflying it — that is
juxtaposing its terms horizontally rather
than vertically. Pocock’s two-fold con-
sciousness must of necessity become tri-
fold at the very least. Effectively, this is
what Colley’s analysis of Britishness and
Otherness also demonstrates. Britishness
relates to a mythical outside through, and
on the condition of, the simultaneous
presence of Protestantism. Without Prot-
estantism, there is no Britishness. In this
schema, Protestantism is the mechanism
via which ethnic, linguistic, regional and
political differences are sutured. Thus,
when Britishness is set against Otherness,
a third term is always already invoked,
whether it is spoken or not.
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In an essay entitled ‘Who needs the
nation? Interrogating “British History”’,
Antoinette Burton argues that the time of
boundaries and Otherness has past and
that:
What we need is conceptual
work that ‘turns on a pivot’ rather
than on the axis of inside/outside
— an image which suggests not
just a balancing act, but the kind
of counter-clockwise historicising
manoeuvre such subjects require
in an era when national histories,
unlike the pivot, seem unwilling
or unable to budge.39
Perhaps what is needed is a new ven-
ture in thought — a less anticipated, less
wearied, conceptual nomenclature that
will generate questions as yet unarticu-
lated, or even entirely un-thought. The
binary is a clumsy rhetorical and metaphys-
ical device that overdraws distinctions and
occludes the fuzzy logic of the borderline.
It tempts us to repeat the exclusion of the
‘middle’, and to collude in the silencing
of the ‘third term’ that animates the dual-
ity whilst contradicting the very terms of
the logic it imposes. Perhaps the figure of
the pivot, with its connotations of mobility
and contingency, could frame a subtler
mode of analysis. A ‘counter-clockwise
historicising manoeuvre’ would not re-
solve the dilemma of the boundary, or
provide a ‘right’ methodology for either
the writing of history or the encounter of
history and theory. It could, however,
encourage us to reconsider and evaluate
the rhetorical and taxonomical choices we
make in the narration of both national and
ethnico-racial belonging.
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